We present a simple model implying that futures risk premia depend on both own-market and cross-market hedging pressures. Empirical evidence from 20 futures markets, divided into four groups (financial, agricultural, mineral, and currency) indicates that, after controlling for systematic risk, both the futures own hedging pressure and cross hedging pressures from within the group significantly affect futures returns. These effects remain significant after controlling for a measure of price pressure. Finally, we show that hedging pressure also contains explanatory power for returns on the underlying asset, as predicted by the model.
Futures prices are known to deviate from expected future spot prices because of risk premia that traders expect to earn (or pay) when trading in futures markets. Futures risk premia are important, because they affect the costs and benefits of hedging, as well as the diversification benefits that result from including futures in investment portfolios. Also, to the extent that economic agents make their production, storage, and consumption decisions by looking at futures prices as indicators of future spot prices, it is important to know the bias that exists in futures prices.
There is an ongoing debate about the determinants of futures risk premia. Futures risk premia are usually related to systematic risk, as in the work of Dusak (1973) , Black (1976) , and Jagannathan (1985) e.g., and to net positions of hedgers in futures markets, which is known as hedging pressure. Hedging pressure results from risks that agents cannot, or do not want to trade because of market frictions such as transaction costs and information asymmetries.
The use of hedging pressure as an explanation for the futures price bias dates back to Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) , and has more recently been incorporated in models that allow both hedging pressure and systematic risk to affect futures prices (see, e.g., Stoll (1979) and Hirshleifer (1988 Hirshleifer ( , 1989 ). Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983) and Bessembinder (1992) provide empirical evidence for the combined role of the futures contracts own hedging pressures and systematic risk, as measured by the covariance between the futures returns and the market return and other economic aggregates.
In this paper we use a simple model in the spirit of Mayers (1976) , Stoll (1979) and Hirshleifer (1988 Hirshleifer ( , 1989 in which agents face multiple sources of nonmarketable risks. The model implies that expected futures returns are determined by hedging pressure and by the covariance of the futures return with the market return. The distinguishing feature of the model used in this paper is that the futures risk premium is not only determined by its own hedging pressure, but also by hedging pressures from other markets, referred to as cross hedging pressures.
We analyze the effect of hedging pressure variables on futures risk premia for 20 futures markets that are divided into four groups: financial futures, agricultural futures, mineral futures, and currency futures. The dataset consists of semi-monthly observations for the period from January 1986 to December 1994. For these markets, we find that both the futures own hedging pressure and cross hedging pressure variables from within the futures own group are important in explaining futures returns. 1 Taking into account that these results might also be explained by the traditional price pressure hypothesis, i.e., a shock in demand or supply causes a temporary price change, it is shown that our findings are robust because (cross) hedging pressure effects are still significantly present after controlling for price pressure effects. We measure price pressure as a change in hedging pressure. It is also shown that hedging pressure variables affect both the futures returns and the returns on the underlying values of the futures contracts. The finding of hedging pressure effects in spot returns, as well as in futures returns is consistent with the predictions of the pricing model, but not with the price pressure hypothesis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a simple model for futures returns. Section II describes the data, and in Sections III and IV an empirical analysis of hedging pressure effects is presented. This paper ends with a summary and some conclusions.
I. Modelling futures risk premia
There is an extensive literature 2 , both theoretical and empirical, that relates futures risk premia to two determinants: systematic risk and hedging pressure. In mean-variance models, if all risks are perfectly marketable, or if all agents have free access to the available financial markets, agents can freely diversify their portfolios and futures risk premia depend on systematic risk only, i.e., on the covariation between futures returns and the market return. To show the nature of models containing both systematic risk and hedging pressure, suppose that there are K assets available in which agents can invest, as well as L futures markets. The net returns on the K assets are denoted by the K-dimensional vector r A;t+1 , where the i-th element of r A;t+1 is given by (P i;t+1 ¡ P i;t )=P i;t . The returns on the L futures contracts are denoted by r F;t+1 , where the i-th element of r F;t+1 is given by (F i;t+1 ¡ F i;t )=F i;t . 3 Apart from these marketable securities, the end of period wealth of an agent may be affected by S nonmarketable positions, the returns on which are given by the S-dimensional vector r S;t+1 . These nonmarketable positions may serve as the underlying value of the futures contracts and can also coincide with some of the K assets in r A;t+1 . However, it is also possible that the nonmarketable positions are different assets or other risky positions. The returns on the nonmarketable positions are defined in the same way as asset returns. The portfolio return of agent j, r j t+1 , is given by
where w j A is the vector of portfolio weights in the K assets, w j F the positions in the L futures contracts, and q j t the sizes of the S nonmarketable positions faced by agent j at time t. The asset weights, futures positions and nonmarketable positions are all expressed as a fraction of wealth invested in financial markets. Throughout the analysis we will make the assumption that q j s;t , the s th element of q j t , is known at the beginning of the period. If r s;t+1 refers to the return on a nonmarketable commodity, this assumption implies that we assume there is no quantity risk. 4
If the wealth of agent j invested in assets is denoted by Y j t , the aggregate nonmarketable position q m s;t is given by
where N is the number of agents. Thus, q m s;t is the wealth-weighted average nonmarketable risk, which we will further refer to as the aggregate nonmarketable risk. For simplicity it is assumed that variances and covariances do not vary over time. Assuming that the portfolio problem for every agent j only depends on the mean and variance of his portfolio return r j t+1 , it can be shown (see Appendix A) that the expected asset and futures returns satisfy:
where ¶ is a vector of ones,´is the Lagrange-multiplier for the restriction that the weights in w A sum to one and¯i has the familiar beta-interpretation,¯i = Cov[r i;t+1 ; r m t+1 ]=V ar[r m t+1 ], and where µ i;s is given by
with°m the market risk aversion parameter. Notice that µ i;s can be either positive or negative, depending on the sign and magnitude of the covariances in equation (4). However, for the futures own hedging pressure, i.e. when the nonmarketable position s is the underlying value of futures contract i, µ i;s is likely to be positive, because in that case the first covariance is positive and typically much larger than the product of the second covariance and¯i. Also note that the model in equations (3a) and (3b) implies that the aggregate nonmarketable risk fraction q m s;t affects the expected returns of futures, as well as assets. This latter result is similar to the CAPM with nontraded assets as discussed in Mayers (1976) . The result that aggregate positions in nonmarketable risks affect the expected returns in futures and asset markets is the well known hedging pressure effect.
In empirical work (see, e.g., Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983) and Bessembinder (1992) ), futures risk premia are usually related to market risk and the futures own hedging pressure.
According to equation (3b) however, the futures risk premium is not only determined by its own hedging pressure, but also by cross hedging pressures. As noted by Anderson and Danthine (1981) , cross hedging may arise because the cash and the futures returns are not perfectly correlated (because of basis risk) or because agents may be concerned about hedging cash positions for which no futures contracts are traded. The remainder of the paper investigates the empirical relevance of these cross hedging pressure effects.
II. Data description
We analyze a dataset consisting of semi-monthly observations of 20 futures contracts over the period from January 1986 to December 1994. to the one studied by Bessembinder (1992 Bessembinder ( , 1993 . Details about the delivery months and the markets in which the futures contracts are traded can be found in Appendix B. We also have observations on the positions of large traders in each of the futures contracts as reported by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The S&P 500 Index is used as a proxy for the market index. All data are obtained from the Futures Industry Institute (FII) Data Center. Continuous series of futures returns are created for each futures contract, for both the first and the second nearest-to-maturity contracts. These return series are created by using a roll-over strategy. For instance, for the nearest-to-maturity series a position is taken in the nearest-to-maturity contract until the delivery month, at which time the position changes to the following contract, which then becomes the nearest-to-maturity contract. To avoid the effect of the October 1987 crash, the returns in this month are excluded from the dataset. This procedure results in a total of 40 series of 190 semi-monthly returns.
Summary statistics for the nearest-to-maturity series for all futures contracts are presented Table I about  here in Table I . These summary statistics roughly confirm some well known stylized facts about futures returns. For instance, mean returns on agricultural and mineral futures are comparable in (absolute) size with the mean returns on financial and currency futures. Standard deviations for agricultural and mineral futures returns are somewhat larger than for financial futures.
Except for the index futures, the t-values reported in Table I show that for most contracts the average futures return is not significantly different from zero. Bessembinder (1992 Bessembinder ( , 1993 uses a sample period that only partially overlaps with our sample period and reports similar statistics for these four categories of futures contracts.
The last two columns of Table I present the unconditional beta of each futures contract relative to the S&P 500 Index, together with the associated t-values, which are based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. We only find betas that are significantly different from zero for financial futures and for gold and silver futures. These betas indicate that most commodity and currency futures in our sample do not have systematic risk, which confirms the results found by Dusak (1973) , Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983) and Bessembinder (1992) .
Finally, Table I 
where the positions are measured by the number of contracts in market s. Given that b q m s;t is constructed from positions that by definition arise from hedge demand, it seems reasonable that this variable will proxy for the aggregate nonmarketable risks.
Summary statistics for the hedging pressure proxies are reported in Table II. Notice that  Table II about  here there is quite a lot of variation in hedging pressure. Substantial variation in hedging pressure exists for particular futures contracts, as measured by the individual standard deviations.
Besides that, the cross-sectional differences between the hedging pressures, as shown by the differences in average hedging pressure, appear to be quite large as well. When introducing the term normal backwardation, Keynes conjectured that it was ''normal'' for producers of agricultural commodities to be the dominant group of hedgers in these markets and to be on the short side of the futures markets. The statistics in Table II however, suggest that in most markets hedgers as a group can be either on the long or on the short side of the market.
III. Cross hedging pressure effects on futures risk premia
As suggested by the model in Section I, as well as by the models of Stoll (1979) and Hirshleifer (1988 Hirshleifer ( , 1989 , and as indicated by the empirical work by Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983) , Chang (1985) , and Bessembinder (1992) , hedging pressure variables are important determinants of expected futures returns. This also follows from the last two columns of Table   II , that show the slope coefficients and the associated t-values from a simple regression of futures returns on their own hedging pressure variable b q m i;t . Except for the index futures and live cattle futures, there is always a significant relation between futures returns and the own hedging pressure. Also, the coefficients that are significantly different from zero always have the expected positive sign. These results confirm the findings of Bessembinder (1992) , who compares the average futures returns conditional upon hedgers being net short or net long.
Especially for mineral and currency futures Bessembinder finds that the average futures returns are significantly larger when hedgers are net short than when they are net long. The difference between his results and the results in Table II 
with ® i = ¡¯i´, 6 E[" i;t+1 ] = 0 and E[r m t+1 " i;t+1 ] = E[q m s;t " i;t+1 ] = 0. Therefore, OLSestimation of equation (6) will yield consistent estimates of ® i ,¯i and µ i;s .
In order to analyze the effects of hedging pressure from other futures markets on the futures risk premia, we study each group of futures contracts, and analyze the effect of the hedging pressure variables within each group on futures returns. As indicated in the previous section, due to the correlation structure of the futures and spot returns, and the fact that the market beta's of the futures contracts are usually close to zero, we may expect cross hedging pressure effects within each group but not between the four groups. 7 Denoting variables referring to futures contract i (i = 1; ::; 5) in group j (j = 1; ::; 4) as x (j)
i , the regression model employed in this section is
Note that the empirical tests of the pricing model are based on both the first and the second nearest-to-maturity futures contracts, which gives the tests more power than only using the nearest-to-maturity contracts.
Estimates of µ (j)
i;s for the nearest-to-maturity contracts in each of the four groups of futures Table III The last two columns of Table III show Wald test statistics for the hypotheses that (a subset of) the coefficients µ (j)
i;s are equal to zero, using both the first and the second nearest-to-maturity futures contracts. These tests are based on a multivariate version of the regression in equation (7), where the first and second nearest-to-maturity futures returns are regressed on the market return and the hedging pressure variables. Therefore, the correlations between the two futures returns are taken into account in constructing the test statistics. 8 If hedging pressure effects on futures risk premia are absent, all coefficients µ
i;s in equation (7) are equal to zero. The second last column in the first panel of 
IV. Robustness of the results
The empirical evidence presented so far suggests that hedging pressure variables are indeed important in explaining futures returns. However, an alternative explanation of the results presented in the previous section might be given by the traditional price pressure hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, an increase in demand (supply) for futures contracts causes an upward (downward) bias in the futures price, which is temporary in nature, and will therefore subsequently be reversed. Therefore, because of the reversal of the futures price change, a sudden demand (supply) of futures contracts will be associated with negative (positive) futures returns. Notice that price pressure may result from any change in demand or supply of futures contracts, and not merely from a change in hedge demand or supply. If hedging demand induces price pressure, it is important to note that the change in hedging pressure generates price pressure. Whereas the model in equation (3b) implies that expected futures returns will be high whenever the level of hedging pressure is high, the price pressure hypothesis implies that expected futures returns will be high when there is a sizable increase in hedging pressure.
In order to see whether futures returns are determined by price pressure or by hedging pressure, 
The variables b q i;t are the futures own hedging pressure, and ¢b q i;t = b q i;t ¡ b q i;t¡1 measures the futures own price pressure. In order to make the coefficients comparable, the hedging pressure and price pressure variables are scaled by their own standard deviation, ¾(:).
The results in Table IV show that for all four categories of futures contracts significant Table IV about  here hedging pressure effects exist, even after controlling for price pressure. Although the relations between futures returns and the futures own hedging pressure variables are somewhat weaker than in Table II 
where, as before, r An alternative way to differentiate between price pressure and hedging pressure effects is to look at the returns in asset and commodity markets rather than futures markets. Notice that our hedging pressure variables are constructed from the aggregate positions that agents take in futures markets rather than the spot markets underlying the futures contracts. Therefore, if the results in the previous section are driven by price pressure instead of hedging pressure, the observed relation between returns and our hedging pressure variables should be limited to futures markets and should not be present in the spot markets. Even though futures prices and the underlying values are related through the cost-of-carry relation, especially in case of commodities it is unlikely that we would also observe this effect in the spot markets, because price pressure is a temporary effect caused by demand or supply shocks in the futures markets.
Notice that the pricing model in Section I implies that hedging pressure effects should be present in both futures markets and asset markets, as can be seen from equations (3a). A finding of hedging pressure in spot markets, and in particual in commodity markets, would therefore lend further support to the pricing model in Section I.
To address this issue, 
where r
(j)
Ai;t+1 is the return on the underlying value of futures contract i in group j and b q 
Appendix A
In this appendix we give a derivation of the model outlined in Section I. Using the notation in Section I, Define the (K + L)-dimensional vectors w j´( w j0 A w j0 F ) 0 and r t+1( r 0 A;t+1 r 0 F;t+1 ) 0 . Given the assumption made earlier that the portfolio problem of the agent depends on the mean and variance of portfolio return only, the problem that agent j has to solve is, using obvious notation,
where f j is increasing in its first argument and decreasing in its second argument, and where ¶ is a K-dimensional vector of ones. Differentiating with respect to w j , the first order conditions imply for the expected asset and futures returns respectively:
where°j = ¡ 1 2 f j 2 (:)=f j 1 (:), and´is the Lagrange-multiplier for the restriction that w 0 A ¶ = 1, which equals the zero-beta return that corresponds to the optimal portfolio w ¤ . Notice that the market portfolio is of the form w m = (w 0 A 0 0 ) 0 , i.e., futures contracts do not enter the market portfolio since they are in zero net supply. If the market portfolio w m is efficient in the sense that it satisfies equation (A5) for°m, the market risk aversion coefficient, and q m s;t , then it is straightforward to show that equations (3a) and (3b) hold.
Appendix B
In this appendix we provide some additional details about the futures contracts used in this paper. For all futures contracts the exchange at which they are traded is given, as well as a list of the delivery months. 
Contract
where i refers to futures contract i in market j (financial, agricultural, mineral, currency 
s;i = 0; 8s, (W all ) and for the hypothesis that all reported coefficients except for the own hedging pressure variable are zero, µ (j) s;i = 0; s 6 = i (W other ). The Wald tests are based on regressions for both the nearest-to-maturity and second nearest-to-maturity contracts and use heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of the covariance matrices. All results are based on semi-monthly observations over the period January 1986 to December 1994, excluding observations in the month October 1987. 
where i refers to futures contract i. The variables b q i;t are the futures own hedging pressure, and ¢b q i;t = b q i;t ¡ b q i;t¡1 measures the futures own price pressure. In order to make the coefficients comparable, the independent variables are scaled by their standard deviation. All reported coefficients are £100. Values between brackets are t-values based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The parameter estimates are reported for the nearest-to-maturity contracts.
The last two columns present p-values associated with Wald tests based on the regression
where i refers to futures contract i in market j (financial, agricultural, mineral, currency). The variables b q i;t is the change in the futures own hedging pressure and therefore controls for price pressure effects. The Wald tests are for the hypothesis that all reported coefficients are zero, µ (j) s;i = 0; 8s, (W all ) and for the hypothesis that all reported coefficients except for the own hedging pressure variable are zero, µ (j) s;i = 0; s 6 = i (W other ). The Wald tests are based on regressions for both the nearest-to-maturity and second nearest-to-maturity contracts and use heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of the covariance matrices. All results are based on semi-monthly observations over the period January 1986 to December 1994, excluding observations in the month October 1987. but this comes down to a distinction between hedgers and speculators (see also Bessembinder (1992) ). 6 If r i;t+1 is the return on a nonzero-investment asset like a stock or a bond, the restriction is ® i = (1 ¡¯i)´.
7 Formal Wald tests for cross hedging pressure effects from the other groups support this conjecture. These results are obtainable from the authors upon request.
8 To be precise, let x t+1 = (1 r S&P 500 t+1 q 1;t :::q 5;t ) 0 , a 7-dimensional vector. Then the multivariate regression system can be written as µ r 1;t+1 r 2;t+1 ¶ = µ x 0 t+1 0 0
x 0 t+1 ¶¯+ µ " 1;t+1 " 2;t+1 ¶ :
The 14 £ 14 matrix b V , consisting of four 7 £ 7 blocks, where the i; j-block is given by ³ P T t=1 x t x 0 t´¡ 1 ³ P T t=1 " i;t " j;t x t x 0 t´³ P T t=1 x t x 0 t´¡ 1 , with i = 1; 2 and j = 1; 2, is therefore a heteroskedasticity consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the 14-dimensional vector b . The hypotheses under consideration impose linear restrictions on¯that yield standard Â 2 -distributions for the Wald test-statistic. 9 We have also run regressions in which the return on the S&P 500 was included as an additional variable in the regression in order to account for market risk. These results are almost identical to the results reported in Table V . The exception is the Value-Line futures, in which case inclusion of the S&P 500 returns yields stronger hedging pressure effects for these futures. 10 We also tested for the presence of hedging pressure effects in asset markets after con-trolling for price pressure. Employing the same regressions and Wald tests that we used for the futures markets in Table IV , we also find significant (cross) hedging pressure effects in most asset markets after controlling for price pressure. These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
